Witchcraft and Legal Pluralism: The Case of Celimo Miquirucama by Clark, David S.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 15 
Issue 4 Forum: Indian Law 
Summer 1980 
Witchcraft and Legal Pluralism: The Case of Celimo Miquirucama 
David S. Clark 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David S. Clark, Witchcraft and Legal Pluralism: The Case of Celimo Miquirucama, 15 Tulsa L. J. 679 
(2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss4/1 
This Native American Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 15 1980 Number 4
WITCHCRAFT AND LEGAL PLURALISM: THE
CASE OF CELIMO MIQUIRUCAMA*
David S. Clark**
An' all us other children, when the
supper things is done,
We set around the kitchen fire an'
has the mostest fun
A-list'nin' to the witch-tales 'at
Annie tells about,
An' the Gobble-uns 'at gits you
Efyou
Don't
Watch
Out!
James Whitcomb Riley, Little Orphant Annie
(stanza 1, lines 7-14), AFTERWHILES
193 (1898).
The idea of legal pluralism as a proper goal of national legal sys-
tems is in ascendancy today. This is true particularly in countries such
* I wish to thank A. Ward Sims of Michie Bobbs-Merrill for his kind permission to use the
translation of the Miquirucama case, which appears in J. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE
LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 368-76 (1978). 1 am also
indebted to Charles F. Seabolt for assistance in translating this case, and to John G. Fleming,
Donald H. Gjerdingen, Rennard Strickland and David M. Treiman for helpful comments on the
manuscript.
** Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. A.B. 1966, J.D.
1969, J.S.M. 1972, Stanford University.
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as the United States with increasingly vocal indigenous minorities.'
The courts in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, similarly, are adju-
dicating claims of their native minorities to land rights and for recogni-
tion of their own laws.2 And in much of Africa, Asia and Latin
America, a significant-at times de facto-legal pluralism is encoun-
tered, involving one or more indigenous systems of customary law with
the superimposition of a Western national legal system.3
Legal pluralism is one aspect of cultural pluralism in a society. Its
emphasis generally reflects dissatisfaction with the more pernicious
government policies aimed at assimilation of ethnic groups into the
dominant culture. In the United States, for instance, the current inter-
est in legal pluralism is a reaction against the nineteenth century notion
of manifest destiny which justified geographical expansion across the
American continent, subduing the Indians (and Mexicans) along the
way.4 Americans exhibited the belief that they were carrying out the
will of Providence, for example, in dismantling in 1898 the Cherokee
tribal courts which had served their people exceedingly well for almost
ninety years.5
The belief in and use of witchcraft is a distinguishing characteristic
of certain cultural groups. Witchcraft exists widely in human society,
today6 as well as in the past. Records of witchcraft go back to the dawn
of history, and some archaeological evidence suggests it even precedes
1. See, eg., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), where Justice Marshall
states:
Indian tribes are "distinct, independent political communities, retaining their origi-
nal natural rights" in matters of local self-government. Although no longer "possessed
of the full attributes of sovereignty," they remain a "separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations." They have power to make their own sub-
stantive law in internal maters, and to enforce that law in their own forums.
Id. at 55-56 (citations omitted).
2. M. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM vii-viii (1975).
3. See generally J. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN
AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 355-84 (1978); LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY (L. Nader
ed. 1969).
4. C. DEGLER, OUT OF OUR PAST: THE FORCES THAT SHAPED MODERN AMERICA 424-25
(rev. ed. 1970). "To reach from ocean to ocean and from Great Lakes to Gulf seemed too geo-
graphically neat not to be part of the Divine intention." Id. at 424.
5. R. STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT 175-82
(1975). "As soon as the Cherokees adapted their culture so that they could survive as a people,
whites stepped in and, through force of arms or legislation, destroyed what the Cherokees had
accomplished. The pattern was repeated again and again." Id. at 8.
6. It was reported, for example, that two self-professed witches from Dimmitt, Texas, were
to stand trial in early 1980 on charges of murdering a young girl on Halloween night. The witch-
es, members of the Church of Arianhu, one of five branches of the Church of Wicca, believe in
magic and in a diety that cannot be understood. Developed from ancient European fertility cults,
the church postulates that each person creates his own evil and Satanic force. The trial has been
[Vol. 15:679
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written history.7 Faith in witchcraft provides a mystical medium
through which important conflicts may be expressed and frequently re-
solved.' For instance, the American Cherokee view law as the earthly
representation of a divine spirit order. Consensus and harmony, rather
than confrontation and dispute, are essential elements of the Cherokee
world view.9 The inherent disharmonies in a social system, then, may
be cloaked under an insistence that there is agreement about the values
of society; those disturbances that do occur are attributed frequently to
the wickedness of certain individuals.
The supernatural relates to law primarily as a support for primi-
tive legal systems with their rudimentary mechanisms for resolving dis-
putes. The supernatural is available as an instrument of judgment and
execution where man's fallible devices to secure evidence are inade-
quate for the job of establishing the facts. Witch doctors or shamans
have the mystical power to detect sorcerers and to combat their evil
actions. The spirits know the truth. If properly requested, they will
omnisciently judge and directly or indirectly punish a wrongdoer. 10 On
the other hand, witchcraft and sorcery frequently involve the misuse of
supernatural powers. They may be regarded as a tort against the victim
and his kinsmen, or as a criminal offense against society.11 In some
cultures, the kinsmen of a witch's victim may kill the sorcerer after (or
sometimes without) obtaining permission from the village or tribal au-
delayed twice while prosecutors search for several witnesses who apparently became afraid and
fled the area. Tulsa World, Jan. 6, 1980, at All, col 1 & Jan. 9, 1980, at B9, col. 1.
7. See generally R. DAVIES, FOUR CENTURIES OF WITCH BELIEFS (1947); C. EWEN, WITCH
HUNTING AND WITCH TRIALS (1929); H. LEA, MATERIALS TOWARD A HISTORY OF WITCHCRAFT
(1939); M. MURRAY, THE WITCH-CULT IN WESTERN EUROPE (1962); G. PARRINDER, WITCH-
CRAFT: EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN (1958); Currie, The Control of Witchcraft in Renaissance Eu-
rope, 3 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 7 (1968).
8. Middleton, The Resolution of Conflict among the Lugbara of Uganda, in POLITICAL AN-
THROPOLOGY 141, 148 (M. Swartz, V. Turner & A. Tuden eds. 1966).
9. R. STRICKLAND, supra note 5, at 10-11 (1975).
10. E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 260 (1954); see B. MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND
CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 86 (1926); Dole, Anarchy without Chaos: Alternatives to Political
Authority among the Kuikuru, in POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 73, 74 (M. Swartz, V. Turner & A.
Tuden eds. 1966); cf J. COLLIER, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ZINACANTAN 121-25 (1973)
(Maya witchcraft beliefs and mediator-shamans).
Recourse to the supernatural survives in American judicial procedure through the swearing
in of each witness with the conditional curse:
I swear to tell the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth.
So help (smite) me God
Professor Hoebel points out that our lawmakers falter in their belief. They buttress the curse with
stiff penalties for perjury. "Oh, ye of little faith." E. HOEBEL, supra, at 266.
11. E. HOEBEL, supra note 10, at 260; M. GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRU-
DENCE 238 (1965).
1980]
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thorities. 12
To illustrate the relationship between law and witchcraft, I present
the translation of a judicial opinion from the Supreme Court of Colom-
bia which demonstrates the clash between distinct legal cultures. The
formal network of Colombian legal norms reaches only certain ele-
ments of Colombian society. Because the distribution of legal re-
sources (courts, lawyers, police, and bureaucrats) is allocated
disproportionately to urban areas, the official Colombian legal sys-
tem-along with its norms-has not penetrated into many rural parts
of the nation. 3 In addition to geographical distance, the social dis-
tance between the white elite, found mainly in the growing cities of the
Colombian highlands, and the mestizo, Indian and black populations,
with their separate ethnic heritages, would impede any attempt at cul-
tural convergence.
The case reported here concerns the death of Francisco GonzAlez,
a witch among the Choc6 Indians. The Choc6 live in the dense tropical
rain forest of northwest Colombia, which receives an average annual
rainfall of 420 inches. They have their own distinct language and way
of life, which includes minimal contact with the formal Colombian le-
gal system. Since the time of the Spanish conquest, their relations with
Spanish-speaking persons have most commonly been with missiona-
ries. Beginning in the colonial period, the increasing black population
of the savannas has pushed the Choc6 upstream in their effort to avoid
acculturation. Today, they number perhaps 10,000, still stibsisting on
slash-and-burn agriculture, supplemented by hunting with bow and ar-
row and with blowgun and poison darts. The Choc6 Indians continue
to avoid contact with outsiders, reserving special derogatory terms for
the groups of blacks they encounter in the rain forests. In turn, the
12. E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT, ORACLES AND MAGIC AMONG THE AZANDE 388-
89 (1937); M. GLUCKMAN, supra note 11, at 238; R. STRICKLAND, supra note 5, at 28-30, 39.
Perhaps the defendant C6limo Miquirucama was motivated by these circumstances. Take,
for instance, the clan regulation of homicide among the traditional Cherokee. Homicide was con-
sidered an offense against the blood of the clan. The ghost of the murdered clansman could not
pass from the earth until the homicide had been avenged. Thus, revenge was a sacred duty resting
with members of the victim's clan. The members of the murderer's clan might, however, serve a
self-policing function by executing the culpable person, thereby eliminating the risk that innocent
clansmen would suffer blood revenge. This sanction was so strongly supported and enforced that
the dangers of blood feud were reported to be minimal. Witchcraft was considered even more
dangerous to society, and was dealt with as a capital crime. R. STRICKLAND, supra note 5, at 27-
29.
13. See J. MERRYMAN, D. CLARK & L. FRIEDMAN, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MEDITER-
RANEAN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA: A HANDBOOK OF LEGAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR
COMPARATIVE STUDY 33-34, 41, 393 (1979).
[Vol. 15:679
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blacks, as Colombians and as Christians, look down on the Indians as
uncivilized. 4
The Miquirucama case (the name of the Indian defendant) is a
window by which to view Choc6 society, although this.perspective is
distorted by the attitudes of the dominant Colombian legal culture.
This distorted view is most clearly focused by the Court's use of expert
medical testimony on the issue of Miquirucama's individual responsi-
bility for the death of Gonzdlez.
There is, first, an implicit clash between the attitudes toward
witchcraft of the Choc6 who testify in this proceeding, and those of the
participating Colombian legal professionals. There is also a gap be-
tween the attitudes expressed by the Court's majority and dissent
roughly reflecting outlooks reminiscent of the nineteenth versus the
twentieth centuries. The majority approach, embodied in the legisla-
tion of 1890 and 1892,15 patronizes Indians in Colombia, and adopts
the legal fiction used by the Spanish crown since the sixteenth century
that Indians should be considered the juridical equivalent of minors.
For the dissent, on the other hand, the Colombian Criminal Code of
1936 utilizes the modem territoriality principle' 6 for scope of coverage,
along with the value of legal equality for all citizens. The Code thus
implies that Indians, as citizens, are rational individuals capable of
overcoming archaic institutions such as witchcraft.
14. AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, FOREIGN AREA STUDIES DIVISION, AREA HANDBOOK FOR CO-
LOMBIA 69-71 (1961).
15. See pp. 685-87 infra.
16. The territoriality principle, a choice of law rule usually associated with the development
of feudalism in the ninth century and later the rise of the nation state, directs that the law applica-
ble to a person should be determined by the territory in which he happens to be present. This is
distinguished from the older personality principle, which still finds some support today, that the
applicable law should be determined by the national group to which an individual belongs. It was
a basic point of Roman policy, for instance, to permit non-Roman subjects to live according to
their own laws. The barbarian kings continued this personality principle during the Middle Ages,
until the increasing importance of trade demanded a more certain system. In the New World, the
Inca applied the personality principle to the Indian groups they conquered, as the Spanish con-
querors applied this principle to the Inca. In fact, most present and former colonies are legally
pluralistic. There is, generally, an area for operation of the colonial government's law, but the rest
is left to indigenous law. J. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, supra note 3, at 81-83, 87, 104-05, 109, 112,
116, 149; cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2)(c) (1971) (considers the
domicil and nationality of the party as an important contact in determining which tort law to
apply).
1980]
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MIQUIRUCAMA, CELIMO
Supreme Court of Colombia (Penal Chamber)
May 14, 1970
134 Gaceta Judicial 303 (1970)
Dr. Justice Jost MARIA VELASCO GUERRERO delivered
the opinion of the Court.
Having examined:
The Court proceeds to resolve the petition filed by the
Superior Court of Villavicencio's public prosecutor against
the July 1, 1969 decision of the lower court. By that decision,
C61imo Miquirucama-an Indian from Mistrad6 (Choc6),
son of Marco Miquirucama, thirty years old, a laborer, a resi-
dent of Mogotes (Granada), a widower, without documents
for personal identification-was sentenced for the security of
society to imprisonment in either a special farm colony or in-
dustrial establishment for a minimum of 48 months. He was
found guilty of the September 29, 1967 homicide of Francisco
Javier GonzAlez U., which occurred in a neighborhood
known as Mogotes within the police jurisdiction of
Canaguaro, municipality of Granada.
The witch, Francisco Gonzdlez U., late at night on Sep-
tember 29, 1967, was in Luis Angel Cardona's house located
in the neighborhood known as "Las Guayanas" or
"Mogotes," State of Meta, preoccupied with praying for a sick
child. It must have been about 2:00 a.m. when Francisco
Javier GonzAlez U. was praying for his patient. Soon the ex-
plosion of a firearm was heard and Gonzdlez fell mortally
wounded. Those present were Abraham GonzAlez Garcia,
Luis Angel Cardona, Arvey Gonzdlez, Francisco Javier and
Flora Javier, children of the victim, who minutes later con-
firmed the death of their father. When the Municipal Judge
of Granada (Meta) initiated the investigation, it originally fo-
cused on Bernardo Marcial Murillo, because of charges
against him by Jos6 Arvey GonzAlez, who asserted that the
accused confided in him his guilt on the day of the burial.
Marcial Murillo denied any guilt in the crime. Nevertheless,
Arvey Gonzdlez categorically maintained his testimony in the
confrontation with the accused on January 2, 1968. Before
the confrontation with the accused on this date, however,
Arvey Gonzdlez, without the least explanation, expanded his
testimony at the inquest on December 20, 1967, changing his
accusation toward C6himo Miquirucama as the murderer of
[Vol. 15:679
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Francisco Gonzalez. On this occasion he cited Emma
Marcial Murillo, wife or companion of C6limo, as the source
of his testimony. Miquirucama then confessed being the au-
thor of Francisco Javier Gonzalez' death in his testimony at
the inquest, but discounted the significance of his act by rea-
soning that "he was a sorcerer," and had already killed his
four children and wife, Matilde Dibaquieza, with a shotgun.
However, while Miquirucama was elaborating on his testi-
mony before the Superior Court, he stated that his children
drowned in the Cingara River in Ansermavieja. At this latter
hearing he did not know how Francisco Javier Gonzalez'
death occurred. He confessed at the previous inquest because
of his fear of Luis Angel Cardona and Jos& Arvey Gonzalez,
his supposed advisors. The Court ordered that Miquirucama
be examined by the Department of Forensic Medicine. With
this done, the medical experts described the accused as "illit-
erate with an extremely limited command of the language in
understanding questions or giving answers. He is a primitive
person, in a semisavage state." (Signed: Dr. Antonio Segura
Garz6n, Chief of Forensic Medicine).
Concluding the investigative phase, the merits of the
charge were evaluated and Miquirucama was called to answer
in court for the crime of aggravated homicide. His conduct
was regulated by the norms of article 29 of the Criminal
Code. A procedural hearing terminated with the dismissal of
charges against all others linked with the investigation. After
the judgment and sentencing of Miquirucama, the Vil-
lavicencio Superior Court public prosecutor applied for a dec-
laration of nullity based on article 37, section 1 of Decree
1358 (1964). The lower court pronounced sentence, ignoring
the public prosecutor's petitions, confirming the judgment in
all respects.
Considerations of the Court
The decision of the court of appeal, and the argument of
the assistant attorney general for criminal matters, repeat an
argument previously put forth by Dr. Luis Zafra, former as-
sistant attorney general. ...
The criminal acts of the uncivilized Indian, argued Zafra,
should be evaluated according to the general criminal rules,
only taking into account that their status should not make
them susceptible to ordinary sanctions ....
Reputable Colombian scholars likewise share these ideas,
affirming that articles 4 and 432 of the present Criminal Code
are sufficiently clear and definitive, annulling the prior doc-
1980]
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trine concerning the special application of 1890 and 1892
laws. In addition, there are reasons of an anthropological and
social nature which should impede the continuation of mis-
sionary practices. Their policy of paternalism is opposed to
personality development in areas of material and spiritual en-
deavor. That which is needed is to take advantage of the
crime's occasion to make the criminal feel a compulsion to
conform to general social norms. The Indian should be
treated like any other man whose attitudes might not be in
conformity with commonly accepted norms of conduct.
Certain crimes committed by Indians may result from
unconquerable ignorance, according to article 23, section 2.
This may be one of the few situations where the application of
the stated precept constitutes an exception to the presumption
of the knowledge of law. But this presumption cannot be ex-
tended to exceedingly special situations such as the one before
us, without creating a serious threat against deficient intel-
lects. And the fault is not the action of individuals, but the
inaction of the State.
In our country coexist highly culturally evolved persons
alongside others who maintain intact prohibited taboos and
magic animism. The transformations of these people will not
be affected by mere contact nor by osmosis. Instead, adequate
penetration of these traditional forces will be a task of more
than just a few years. It belongs to the anthropologist and
politician, more than to the jurist and the doctor.
In this sense, various international conferences have ex-
pressed agreement in seeking special treatment for uncivilized
peoples and groups. After many years of anticipation, our
Law 89 (1890), article 1, juridically realized the constant
hopes of anthropologists, psychiatrists and psychologists. ...
With this stated, it is now necessary to make clear that in
the problem sub indice, the essence of the question is rooted in
finding out if article 1 of Law 89 (1890) is applicable, which
excludes the uncivilized Indian populations from the principle
of juridical equality. Article 26 of the Constitution, further-
more, does not allow application of criminal sanctions except
in conformity with the rules of procedure, and then only by
virtue of sentences decreed by competent judges.
The Court will consider the applicability of Law 89
(1890), article 1, in light of article 58 of the Constitution:
"Justice is a public service preempted by the Nation." . . .
[Vol. 15:679
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This norm becomes significant in light of article 2 of Law
72 (1892), authorizing the executive to delegate to missiona-
ries the competence to judge Indians in matters of a civil or
criminal nature ...
[The assistant attorney general argues] that modem doc-
trine advocates the return to the concept of culpability as the
foundation of all suppressive systems, and the return to a uni-
form system of punishment. But so long as our rules are not
modified, these advocated reasons are valid for the legislator,
but not for the judge who finds in the written law the exclu-
sive source for his decisions.
The standard is erroneous which defines the minor, by
the very fact of being a minor, as a person dangerous to soci-
ety. This is also so when the standard defines the savage as
psychologically deficient, for the simple fact that their existen-
tial environments have not risen to a degree of progress which
distinguishes civilized peoples. In this manner it is forgotten
that subintelligence is irreversible; the exiquisite rustic charac-
ter known in savages, which gives them the ability to adapt to
agricultural labor, presupposes that they are capable of evolv-
ing and placing themselves in conditions of assimilating a
farm culture, the original cement in the evolution of peoples
and a permanent activity of the already civilized. The differ-
ence between savages and civilized, educated man is rooted in
the different degrees of their evolution, which makes savages
strangers in a world contemporary to theirs, a world whose
values obey a complex conceptual hierarchy, slowly and pa-
tiently sculpted by history and processed with the interaction
and experience of diverse cultures. A modern order of values
demands the existence of an ethical personality, which is in-
compatible with the savage condition with its rudimentary so-
cial content and the "undifferentiated self' of its people,
characterized by a diverse complexity in the peculiar and dif-
fuse form of sensing intuitively. ...
Primitive peoples are ruled in their personalities by the
law pro toto. Each part corresponds essentially to the whole
and determines it. There are no accessory parts in the primi-
tive "self." All parts of the corporal and spiritual "self' repre-
sent to a certain point the psychic totality. The name is not
part of the person, but is instead the person itself. Dress, ar-
rows, hair, the shadow, a nose--these are not attributes or
parts of the person. They are confused with the "self' from
which they are projected, magically, without setting one
against the other. This very thing occurs with the diffuse and
1980]
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undifferentiated "self' of the man and his surrounding world,
in light of which his personality is strictly limited, for with it
he is blended. The man, the jaguar, the goat, the fish-all are
persons with different properties and aspects. The reason for
this undifferentiated form of being in the primitive or savage
"self' is derived from the non-existence of an ethical person-
ality. Further, the Indian does not show a sense of the good
or the bad. His concept of the individual is crude and is con-
fused with the agreeable or prejudicial. His knowledge of the
ideal or the moral do not form part of his conduct. (H.
WERMER, SOCIOLOGk EVOLUTIVA.)
Existentially, the world of the savage does not coincide
with the civilized world with which it is chronologically con-
temporaneous. . . . Sociologists would say that the modem
and traditional coincide. Biologically, primitive man and civ-
ilized man coincide equally. But the former is not a social
category. Because of this, although the two coexist in time
within the ambit of nationality, they do not live together cul-
turally and are governed by different rules. . . . Rafil Haya
de la Torre notes with exceeding insight that to take a trip
across time it is sufficient to journey from one corner of our
American continent to the other. The distances widen when
we think that in the last thirty years the civilized world has
evolved geometrically, compared to preceding centuries. In
the epoch of atomic fission, of genetic engineering, when mo-
lecular biology promises to revolutionize the behavior of
animal groups, including man, the savage is our irreversible
past--even more, the modern prehistoric. Our laws estab-
lished for the contemporary world do not reach this past. The
present Criminal Code does not contain juridical or mental
categories to conform with the condition of these savages.
Certainly it has categories for normal, civilized people. ...
Law 89 (1890) in article 1, is definitive in its provisions.
It establishes a special regimen for savages who commit
crimes and, in general, it divides them into three large catego-
ries: savages, semisavages, and civilized. Only for the last
category of persons is general legislation considered applica-
ble. Its text forms a complete juridical proposition, clear in its
literal tenor. . . . The Commission of Redactors of the 1936
[Criminal] Code ignored its existence. Perhaps they consid-
ered it in force and simply did not amend it since tribes ex-
isted in the condition of life to which the provisions of the
statute refer. . ..
The Court insists that Indians, simply because they are
[Vol. 15:679
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Indians, are not deficient or retarded mentally. However,
they may be equivalent to minors by the legal fiction estab-
lished in article 40 of Law 89 (1890). Experts agree that psy-
chopaths, the mentally retarded, and minors, psychologically
speaking, show common characteristics. The three possess a
special personality, the dominant trait of which is an undiffer-
entiated "self" labile, lacking concentration, and not distinct
from the surrounding world, into which it blends.
This special "self' is encountered in each one of these
three states, but for different reasons. In the child the "self' is
incipient, but in a state of development. In the Indian the
characteristic of the "self' depends on the conditions of its
environment. The causes are exogenous. In neither of these
cases is there abnormality. In the mentally retarded, on the
other hand, the "self' is arrested in its development. Its con-
dition is irreversible in character. The schizophrenic's condi-
tion is rooted in the dissolution of his personality, which in a
normal state would be formally delimited. (Schilder, Storch)
Medrano Ossio believes that "the psychological state of
today's Indian renders it impossible to make him a responsi-
ble person as demanded by the rules presently in force. The
native does not, with his limited conscience, reach a true un-
derstanding of the act that he commits, even if it is an abomi-
nable crime. . . . The life of the contemporary Indian
develops on the margin of the white and mestizo civilization.
The principle of equality before the law in which he finds
himself placed, therefore, is absurd. He sums up: "In view of
these realities, the Indian should be considered nonculpable
for his crimes; the punishment, being ineffective, should be
replaced by psychopedagogical, psychiatric, and other meas-
ures which might make the Indian an innocuous person, a
person definitively incorporated into present civilized soci-
ety."
Some Latin American criminal legislation, doctrinally in-
spired by the principles which formed the basis of our 1936
reform in order to remedy the problems created in their terri-
tory by the existence of aboriginal peoples, promulgated spe-
cific provisions for the idiosyncrasy of primitive man. This is
the case with Venezuela. In the draft Code of 1967, article 16
states: "The Court shall be able to declare nonculpable an
Indian who commits an act classified as punishable, taking
into account his inability to comprehend the illicit nature of
1980]
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his act or to conform with the legal standards of con-
duct." . ..
Conclusions of the Court
C61imo Miquirucama was described by medical experts
as an "illiterate with an extremely limited command of the
language in understanding questions or giving answers." This
evidence, consequently, indicates with unquestionable preci-
sion that the accused is located in the second of three catego-
ries for Indians recognized by our legislation. He is a
semisavage whose acts remain outside the control of the ordi-
nary legislation of the Republic. Even so, the trial judge, and
later the Superior Court of Villavicencio, subjected his con-
duct to the provisions of article 29 of the Criminal Code, and
to the punishments dealt with in book I, title 2, chapter 2 of
the same statute, condemning him to 48 months imprison-
ment in a farm colony. The lower courts relied upon medical
testimony-folio 90 of the principal record-defining Mi-
quirucama as a mental weakling, a victim, consequently of a
serious psychiatric anomaly. By this application, they in-
curred a manifest error of fact in the evaluation of said evi-
dence since the accused should be classified as what another
medical expert called an illiterate semisavage. . . . In addi-
tion, the lower court judgment was vitiated by nullity-in-
competence of jurisdiction-for failure to defer to article 1 of
Law 89 (1890). ...
This is not the first time the Court has considered opera-
tive provisions derived from laws prior to the promulgation of
the present Criminal Code. . . . The Colombian criminal
legislation is a complete whole. All of its provisions are not
included in the same statute, or within special statutes. It is
sufficient that the norms be considered operative in light of
the correct juridical construction which determines their hier-
archy and dominance. ...
Since article 1 of Law 89 (1890) excludes Indians found
in a semisavage condition from the normative control of ordi-
nary legislation, and article 2 of Law 72 (1892) gives the exec-
utive power to delegate competence in civil and criminal
matters into the hands of missionaries, these norms clearly
conflict with the Constitution [articles 26 and 58]. Jurisdiction
is solely within the power of the government. It is a
deplorable consequence that Indians, in a savage and semi-
savage condition, whose acts are prohibited by the criminal
[Vol. 15:679
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law, lack the control of sanctioning norms, and, for the same
reason, competent judges.
It should not be too much to mention that jurisdiction
must be clearly established by legislation. Judges are not per-
mitted to enact or deduce it by analogy.
The petition is granted.
By merit of the expressed considerations, the Supreme
Court-Chamber of Penal Cassation-administering justice
in the name of the Republic and the Law,
Resolves:
First. The sentence announced by the Superior Court of
Villavicencio, by which it imposed upon C6limo Miquiru-
cama the punishment of imprisonment in a special farm col-
ony or an industrial establishment for a minimum term of 48
months, because of his guilt for the crime of homicide perpe-
trated on the person of Francisco Javier Gonzdlez U., is inval-
idated.
Second. All that has occurred in the procedures against
C6limo Miquirucama, from the hearing of October 3, 1967,
the date when the Municipal Court of Granada (Meta) an-
nounced its finding, is declared null.
Third. The immediate release of the accused is ordered.
Publish, notify, copy, and insert this opinion in the
Gaceta Judicial, and remand this case to the court of origin.
Justices Luis CARLOS PEREZ and Luis ENRIQUE Ro-
MERO SOTO dissent.
First. We agree with the majority of the Penal Chamber
that the principal issue to determine with regard to Indians
found in a state of savagery is whether (1) the provisions of
the Criminal Code or (2) article 1 of Law 89 (1890), which
excepted these Indians from the principle of juridical equal-
ity, govern. Also we agree that the criterion of dangerousness
or mental sickness applied to Indians or minors, because they
are Indians or minors, is not correct. This is an erroneous
thesis, as the Chamber observes, since it revives ideological
theories contrary to the advances of law and anthropology.
The dangerous nature of Indians was argued by some South
American professors at unfortunate moments of their careers;
• . . we have always believed in the adaptability of all human
beings to overcome conditions of backwardness that are not
precisely due to their caprice.
Second. We also agree with the majority of the Chamber
1980]
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on various appraisals of primitive mentality endorsed by for-
eign writers. .... The savage, according to these studies, has
great gusto for knowledge of things that surround him, a fact
which presumes intellectual capacities. The universe for him,
just as much as for the rest of mankind, is an object of thought
and a means for satisfying needs. . . If we were to
strengthen this line of authority, we would refer to a constella-
tion of North Amercian scientists who unanimously agree
with the brilliant and harmonious exposition of Claude L6vi-
Strauss.
Third. For us, the key issue in the petition is resolved by
affirming that articles 4 and 432 in the Criminal Code tacitly
repeal Law 89 (1890) and Law 72 (1892). As a result, the
criminal law should operate against all inhabitants of the Re-
public, whether they be citizens or foreigners, transients or
domiciliaries, city dwellers or frontiersmen. There can be no
other conclusion derived from the principle of national sover-
eignty, supported by the principle of territoriality consecrated
in article 4. This public norm gives the State the right of au-
thority over all who may be found in its territory.
There are several obvious sources of misunderstanding between
the Choc6 and the Colombian legal authorities. Language is one major
problem. Significant cultural differences provide an even greater bar-
rier to communication. 17 But probably the greatest source of misunder-
standing derives from the divergent Choc6 and Colombian notions of
what the criminal legal process is all about. On the one hand, the Co-
lombian authorities, under the rules of criminal procedure, are con-
cerned with ascertaining the truth regarding an accused's conduct, and
thus his guilt or innocence. For the Choc6, on the other hand, it is
likely that their perception of law is designed to produce a compromise.
Verifiable facts are central to Colombian legal procedure, but probably
secondary to Choc6 purposes. The conflict between legal cultures is
17. Wurm, Aboriginal Languages andthe Law, 6 U.W. AUSTL. L. REv. 1 (1961), reprinted in
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PROCESS 994-98
(1974) [hereinafter cited as J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ].
[The aboriginal] legal system is different from that of the white man, and while the
notions of "unlawfully" as that of something done in contravention to established law,
and of "murder" as that of the unlawful killing of another human, may be part of [an
aborigine's] concept system, he may be at a loss to understand why in a given situation
these concepts should be applied to some of his actions which, according to his idea of
law, were neither unlawful nor murder.
Id. at 996.
[Vol. 15:679
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apparent.' 8
The Colombian Supreme Court in Miquirucama appears aware of
the undesirable result produced when the official legal system is used
for Indian disputes. Steeped in the civil law tradition, the Colombian
legal system has a long and notable history reaching back to the Siete
Partidas of medieval Spain and ultimately to early Roman times. In
contrast, many jurists trained in Colombian law schools see Indians as
uncivilized savages, or at best, as individuals under the influence of
primitive superstition. 19
The Indian perspective toward the Colombian legal system and its
procedures, similarly, impedes rapprochement. Professor Collier, in
her excellent study of Zinacantecos in southern Mexico,2 implies that
many Indian groups have only two explanations for homicide: the vic-
tim was a witch, as in this case, or the murderer was drunk. An Indian
accused of murder, consequently, will give a predictable response. Na-
tional authorities inevitably conclude that liquor and witchcraft super-
stitions are the principal causes of violence in Indian society.21 But
Indian motives for violence are as complex as those in any community.
The language for describing their behavior, especially to outsiders who
are not familiar with Indian culture, appears simple. The local Indian
dispute-resolution mechanisms, in seeking to understand the behavior
of a murderer, delve deeper for the explanation. In the process these
devices may ultimately provide a more satisfactory settlement for their
community.22
The moral dilemma presented by Miquirucama is primarily a
problem of individual responsibility: How can a legal system prevent
injustice when the criminal code presumes intent or at least criminal
negligence in the commission of a crime, even though the accused be-
lieves his aims are legitimate because he is ridding the world of an evil
witch?2 3 Is it not unjust to impose a harsh penalty on a superstitious
18. See J. COLLIER, supra note 10, at 41-42; R. STRICKLAND, supra note 5, at 10-11.
19. See the report on the common sport of Indian hunting in Colombia, similar to that in the
historic American West, and the weak judicial response, in J. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, supra
note 3, at 178-79. See also J. COLLIER, supra note 10, at 43.
20. J. COLLIER, supra note 10.
21. Id. at 44; see G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 175-76 n.12 (2d ed.
1961).
22. J. COLLIER, supra note 10, at 44; see Hunt & Hunt, The Role of the Courts in RuralMex-
keo, in PEASANTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 109, 131, 136-39 (P. Bock ed. 1969). See generally B.
MALINOWSKI, supra note 10, at 85-94.
23. Although the desire to do good may be a moral excuse for crime, it is generally not a legal
excuse. Nevertheless, English courts in the nineteenth century (although not today) tended to
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Indian whose principal fault is lack of contact with a civilizing Western
influence?24
In Miquirucama, the majority of the Colombian Supreme Court,
through Justice Velasco, discusses feasible solutions to the problem of
individual responsibility. First, the Court presents the argument of
Luis Zafra,25 a former assistant attorney general, who believes that
criminal acts of Indians should be evaluated according to the national
criminal code, but that sanctions should vary for Indians, possibly
based on the education or experience of the accused.26 This treatment
might allow the use of doctrines analogous to provocation or dimin-
ished responsibility, where the circumstances reveal that the defendant
could not be expected to control himself completely (according to na-
tional norms, although he might have acted consistently with tribal
norms). Proof of these mitigating factors would then warrant classifica-
tion to a lower degree of criminal homicide.
The standard of "adequate" provocation is obviously shaped by
acquit parents who, for religious reasons, failed to summon medical aid to their sick children. In
view of the New Testament authority for faith healing (James, 5: 14-15), Professor Williams
points out that a nation professing Christianity might be expected to exempt from punishment a
religious group which follows literally the word of God. There is always the possibility that the
minority is right about faith healing. Thus, some medical opinion today supports the position that
many cases of organic disease are directly caused by mental orientations. See G. WILLIAMs, supra
note 21, at 748-50.
24. J. COLLIER, supra note 10, at 43; Vf Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62
HARV. L. REv. 616, 621 (1949) (Justice Fosters reasoning for the Supreme Court of Newgarth
absolves the cannibalistic spelunkers of murder on the ground that "a case may be removed mor-
ally from the force of a legal order, as well as geographically"). But see Regina v. Machekquon-
able, 28 Ont. 309 (1898), where the Canadian court refused to acquit the defendant Indian who
shot and killed a Windigo (believed to be a cannibalistic evil spirit clothed in human flesh), but
owing to mitigating circumstances permitted the verdict of manslaughter to stand. The threat of
cannibalism was a matter of widespread concern to the Northern Ojibwa, and the Windigo kill-
ings were considered acts of maintining social order. J. GOLDSTEIN, A DERSHOWITZ & R.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 985-89.
25. See p. 685 supra.
26. This approach of reduced punishment is used in Australia. For example, Nadigi
Tjapltjari, a Pintubi aborigine, speared his tribal wife for adultery, a legitimate response under
tribal law. Tjapltjari was sentenced to 12 months in jail for manslaughter, but the judge also ruled
that he must be released early if "prison does not agree with him." A Pintubi witch doctor was
being sought to gauge the psychological effect of incarceration on Tjapltjari. Wash. Post, Oct. 5,
1969, reprinted inJ. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 998. Judge
Kriewaldt, in referring to the aborigines in the Northern Territory of Australia, states:
I see no reason why, in proper cases, exceptions should not be made in the general appli-
cation of laws, and in particular, I see no reason why certain classes in a community
should not be tried for offenses in a manner different from that employed for the major-
ity.
Kriewaldt, The Application of the Criminal Law to the Aborigines of the Northern Territory ofAus-
tralia, 5 U.W. AUSTL. L. REv. 1 (1960), reprinted in id. at 992; see Regina v. Muddarubba, Judg-
ment of Feb. 2, 1956, Northern Territory (Australia) Supreme Court (unpublished), in id. at 989-
91.
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 15 [1979], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss4/1
19801 LEGAL PLURA4LISM
social convention, and a "reasonable person" test has been used in
England and the United States.27 If this test were based on a subjective
standard, as the Model Penal Code partially recommends, then a "rea-
sonable Indian" inquiry might lead to a more just accommodation be-
tween the dominant and minority cultures.28 The doctrine of
diminished capacity, likewise, recognizes that the impaired psychologi-
cal condition of a defendant, though short of insanity, provides a miti-
gating rationale for classifying an intentional killing as manslaughter
rather than murder.2 9
Second, Justice Velasco appears to adopt the reasoning of the legal
fiction in article 40, Law 89 (1890), treating Indians as minors for pur-
poses of the criminal law. 0 This fiction then justifies the application of
article 1 from that statute, excluding semisavages from the normative
control of ordinary national legislation. The nineteenth century plan
for Indians foresaw missionary jurisdiction over uncivilized Indians
under Law 72 (1892), but this statute is unconstitutional under articles
26 and 58 of the Colombian Constitution. Hence, no competent
court-that is, a court with.jurisdiction to apply the 1936 Criminal
Code-is available to try Miquirucama. He is released, therefore, to
face the dictates of his community.
27. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 242-50 (1978).
28. The Model Penal Code declares that the defense of provocation should be judged "from
the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to
be." There must be a "reasonable explanation," however, bringing the objective standard in
through the back door. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(l)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See
Regina v. Muddarubba, Judgment of Feb. 2, 1956, Northern Territory (Australia) Supreme Court
(unpublished), in J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOwrrz & R. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 989-91,
where the judge used a "reasonable Indian" test for provocation, finding that the Pitjintara tribe is
a "separate community for purposes of considering the reaction of the average man."
29. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 250-53. See also People v. Ray, 14 Cal.3d 20, 533
P.2d 1017, 120 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975); People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr.
815 (1966); State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 143, 126 N.W.2d 285 (1964); Fingarette, Diminished
Mental Capacity as a Criminal Law Defense, 37 MOD. L. REv. 264 (1974).
30. See p. 689 supra. See generally the jurisprudential views of John Rawls, who posits three
stages in the sequence of moral development as it relates to a system of justice: the morality of
authority, the morality of association, and the morality of principles. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 462-79 (1971). Moral feelings may be a natural outgrowth of a complete appreciation of
our social nature. Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to So-
cialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347-480 (D. Goslin ed.
1969). Some contend that adults in particular societies may not advance beyond certain stages of
moral development.
[T]he impression we have from known ethnographical work [is] that in many societies
adult thought does not go beyond the level of "concrete" operations, and therefore does
not reach that of propositional operations which develop between the ages of twelve and
fifteen in our milieus.
J. PIAGET, PSYCHOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 60-61 (1971).
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Release of Miquirucama implies reliance upon the notion of ex-
cuse. The theory of excuse in criminal law concedes that an act is
wrongful, but seeks to avoid attribution of the act to the defendant.
The focus is thus on the actor's personal capacity to avoid either com-
mitting an intentional wrong or taking an undue risk."' Insanity is the
classic example of excuse.3 2 But here, the reasoning of the Miquiru-
cama Court majority would appear to excuse an entire group of indi-
viduals.
Is the result of the majority tenable in the modem world? Should
adults of ethnic minorities be treated as children or as "unconquerably
ignorant"?33 Justices Perez and Romero, in dissent, say no.34 Citing
recent anthropological research, they state their belief "in the adapta-
bility of all human beings to overcome conditions of backwardness. '35
Based on the desirability of the modem nation state and its territorial-
ity principle, as well as the idea of juridical equality, Miquirucama
should be treated as any other citizen and receive his punishment for
the crime of homicide.
Does the majority or dissent present the better view? The equality
principle has been expressed in the United States with growing fre-
quency and even stridency throughout this century.36 But what would
be the pragmatic consequence of "equal" treatment of Indians in na-
tional courts controlled by personnel schooled in the dominant legal
culture? According to Bronislaw Malinowski:
There is hardly anything more pernicious, therefore, in the
many European ways of interference with savage peoples,
than the bitter animosity with which Missionary, Planter, and
Official alike pursue the sorcerer. The rash, haphazard, un-
scientific application of our morals, laws, and customs to na-
tive societies, and the destruction of native law, quasi-legal
machinery and instruments of power leads only to anarchy
and moral atrophy and in the long run to the extinction of
31. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 798-802, 817-18.
32. Consider, however, the recent case of Donald Lang. He has been accused of two murders
in Illinios, but he cannot hear, speak, read or write. Because Lang is incapable of participating
effectively in his own defense, state courts held that he cannot be tried for murder. Yet state
mental-health officials report that Lang is not mentally retarded. His handicap is physical-apha-
sia-so there is nothing they can do. A Chicago judge ruled, consequently, that Lang could go
free on bail. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7, 1977, at 89-90.
33. See p. 686 supra.
34. See p. 691 supra.
35. Id.
36. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUrIONAL LAW 991 (1978).
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culture and race.37
Providing formal equality to an Indian defendant within the context of
the white legal system, therefore, without Indian participation at all
levels of decisionmaking, is likely to be a sham.38
A compromise between the majority and dissent might save some-
thing of Indian legal culture, bow to the ideology of equal justice under
law, and reduce the dilemma of individual responsibility. This might
most effectively be accomplished through a system of tribal courts
which apply Indian law. 39 Indian culture should be respected and ac-
commodated where possible. When the national law must intrude, par-
ticularly in the penal area, a single code of norms should apply to all
citizens.40 The special circumstances of tribal Indians, however, should
be accommodated in these instances through the use of a mitigation
doctrine, analogous to diminished responsibility, when imposing sanc-
tions.41 This is preferable to totally waiving sanctions for serious
crimes under the doctrine of excuse, or under the reasoning of the
Court in Miquirucama. The problem with excusing groups of Indians
is twofold. First, the tribal system of social control may be inadequate
to handle serious criminal matters, thereby unjustly endangering the
safety of its members.42 Second, and possibly more important, the po-
tential for indigenous cultures to adapt and survive in a sometimes hos-
37. B. MALINOWSKI, supra note 10, at 93.
38. See 0. OLNEY & D. GETCHES, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE: REPORT OFTHE
NAICJA LONG RANGE PLANNING PROJECT 7-13 (1978). As to American Indians:
Most Indian reservations are located in rural areas, far from federal and state courts.
When county courts and justice courts are nearby, they are usually in border towns
where hostility toward Indians may run high and sympathy for Indian values may be
lacking.
Id. at 89. Judge Kriewaldt speaks in reference to the aborigines of Australia:
My belief that a jury is not qualified to decide on the guilt of an aborigine rests on
this: The factor which makes a jury a good tribunal in the ordinary run of cases, the
ability to discern whether a witness is speaking truly, vanishes when the jury is con-
fronted with witnesses of whose thought-processes they are ignorant.
Kriewaldt, supra note 26, at 994; f Note, The Case For Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 531-33
(1970) (similar argument for blacks).
39. See 0. OLNEY & D. GETCHES, supra note 38. For the successful experience of the Cher-
okees, see R. STRICKLAND, supra note 5, passim.
40. In the United States, Indian court jurisdiction is restricted, for example, by the Major
Crimes Act of 1885, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976) and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C.§§ 1302-1303 (1976).
41. See p. 694 supra.
42. Certain Indian groups in Mexico, for instance, routinely send homicide cases to the state
court system, although they retain most other disputes between Indians for their own courts. Hunt
& Hunt, supra note 22, at 131-33. Compare the philosophical development of the Cherokee dur-
ing the nineteenth century from clan revenge to public reform through the use of specific punish-
ments. R. STRICKLAND, supra note 5, at 168-74.
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tile Western environment demands partial acculturation toward that
dominant culture. 3
Legal pluralism need not be a one-way street. There is much to
learn from indigenous cultures about the nature and function of law in
society. The dangers of moral relativism44 in this context are fewer
than those of manifest destiny. Accommodation is preferable to assim-
ilation and extinction.45
43. Acculturation refers to the change induced in one culture by its encounter with another.
P. FARB, MAN'S RISE TO CIVILIZATION: THE CULTURAL ASCENT OF THE INDIANS OF NORTH
AMERICA 247, 251-52 (2d rev. ed. 1978); see R. STRICKLAND, supra note 5, at 183-89.
44. Moral relativism takes the position that judgments as to whether acts are "moral" or
"immoral" have no meaning except in the context of a particular culture. Critics of this view are
wont to point to the holocaust of Nazi Germany; this, they argue, requires an absolute moral
standard that transcends any one society. But absolutism has its own disadvantages as illustrated
by the current debate over abortion in the United States. Which group, for instance, is to set the
standard regarding feticide?
Professor Ely suggests an approach for avoiding the problem of Nazi Germany. Some gov-
ernment policies burden certain distinct groups in society more than other groups. This is inevita-
ble. However, when the decisionmakers (legislators, administrators, judges) disproportionately
represent favored groups (e.g., white males), a decision to burden other groups (e.g., blacks, Indi-
ans, females) will have its roots in a comparison between a "we" stereotype and a "they" stereo-
type. These roots are grounded frequently in assumptions of "we" superiority and "they"
inferiority.
The danger is therefore greater in we-they situations that we will overestimate the valid-
ity of the proposed stereotypical classification by seizing upon the positive myths about
our own class and the negative myths about theirs.
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf .4 Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933 n.85 (1973).
In a society accepting moral relativism, we-they situations deserve greater scrutiny regarding
their desirability than we-we situations (where decisionmakers burden their own class). Thus,
Jews did not participate in decisions regarding the holocaust, nor did blacks formulate slavery
policy, nor did American Indians develop the resettlement programs.
45. See generally P. FARB, supra note 43, at 273-76.
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